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Abstract
In this paper we analyze a general equilibrium model in which agents choose to be
employed in formal or in the informal sector. The formal sector is taxed to provide
income subsidies and the level of redistribution is determined endogenously through
majority voting. We explore how the demand for redistribution determined by ma-
jority voting interacts with the incentive to work in the untaxed informal market. We
also investigate how diﬀerent levels of the informal sector wage can explain simul-
taneous changes in the size of the informal sector and level of redistribution. The
model is simulated to produce qualitative results to illustrate the diﬀerences between
economies with diﬀerent distributional features. The model accounts for the diﬀerent
sizes of informal sector and income redistribution in Mexico and United States.
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1 Introduction
With a large portion of the world’s poor in developing countries, why is it that there is
little income redistribution in these countries? When the issue is as vital as income one
would expect to find a significant popular demand for higher redistribution regardless of
the type of regime since even dictators worry about street riots by the masses. In this
paper, we present a political economy model that accounts for this puzzle. We argue that
the poor in developing countries work in the informal sector to generate supplementary
income when the government cannot tax enough from the richer to generate subsidy for the
poor. (The precise definition of what constitutes informal market activity will be clarified
in the following section.) We show that the government can not tax enough because if the
formal sector is not suﬃciently lucrative at least some people opt to spend their work hours
in the informal sector. In addition, they vote to ease the taxes on those who do so that
the formal sector workers can earn enough to provide for themselves and also to give up
some of their income for redistribution. Depending on how lucrative the informal sector is
and how productive the workers are, people may choose to work in the informal sector to
accommodate for their low levels of productivity. This in turns leads to less output in the
formal sector with little to redistribute. This is consistent with the observation that the
existence of a large informal sector coincides with less redistribution. 1.
Analysis of the size of the informal sector has generally been confined to either growth
models or computable general equilibrium models. We adopt the latter line of modeling and
add more to it by endogenizing the decision with regard to how much to redistribute. We
then simulate the model to study the comparative statics of a developing and a developed
economy. We explore how the demand for redistribution determined by majority voting
interacts with the incentive to work in the untaxed informal market.
This paper diﬀers from the previous informal sector literature in that we endogenize
the choice of tax rate and embed it in a simple labor-leisure choice problem. The novelty
of this paper is that it oﬀers an explanation for simultaneous changes in the size of the
informal sector and level of redistribution as a result of changes in the informal sector wage
skill distribution and identity of the median voter. A distortion in the democratic rule in
favor of the rich reduces transfers while the size of the informal sector may remain at high
levels. Despite a greater demand for redistribution in societies where the majority has few
resources (skills), we find that political systems which work in favor of a rich minority will
1Using data from 79 countries, the regression analysis of the size of the informal sector and spending on
welfare as percentage of GDP produces a significant negative correlation. See Appendix A for details.
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produce little redistribution. When coupled with a suitable wage distribution, the type of
political regime acts to reduce transfers much faster than the equivalent reduction in the
informal sector. Hence, a political system that is hostile to the poor can work to impede
the positive eﬀects of economics growth.
In terms of the theoretical model this paper is related to previous work in several ways.
Ihrig and Moe(2004) develop a dynamic model to explain the evolution of the informal sec-
tor towards steady state. They show that exogenous reduction in tax rates reduce the size
of the informal sector, whereas in our paper the relation depends on the skill distribution
and identity of the median voter. We also analyze the relationship when one country moves
toward a more democratic-setup by changing the identity of the median voter whose choice
of tax rate is endogenous. Dessy and Pallage (2003) develop a heterogeneous-agent model
with incomplete markets where the taxes levied on the formal sector is used to finance a
public infrastructure which can be accessed only by formal agents. This premium from for-
malization provides an explanation for the prevalence of a large, low-productivity, informal
sector in developing countries. In our paper, we let both sectors reap such benefits since
the government uses all tax revenue for redistribution. In our paper, the diﬀerence between
rich and poor countries is not due to initial conditions, but depends on how democratic
the regime is. DePaula and Scheinkman (2006) define informality as tax avoidance, i.e. as
undeclared production or sales by oﬃcially recorded firms2, whereas we define informality
as illegal production of legal goods by unoﬃcial firms. Our definition emphasizes the role of
labor markets in determining the size of informal sector especially in developing countries.
The premium to formalization is also featured in Chong and Gradstein (2007) who oﬀer an
explanation of the level of informality based on inequality and institutional quality. They
find a higher inequality level leads to more informality and this eﬀect is reinforced by poor
institutional quality
Because the tax policy is treated as exogenous, most of the literature does not account
for why a large informal sector can coexist with little redistribution. The methodological
approach of this paper rests both on the median voter literature and on the urban infor-
mal sector literature while also building in income redistribution. Following the one-sector
Meltzer and Richard (1981) model, the individuals are heterogenous with respect to their
earning capabilities3, and choose the optimal number of hours of work, given a competitive
wage rate. Assuming that the government’s sole purpose is to redistribute incomes (with no
administrative costs), there is a lump-sum subsidy per person which is financed by income
2In the literature, this is sometimes referred to as irregular sector.
3For a dynamic political-economy model of Meltzer and Richards, see Krussel and Rios-Rull (1999).
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tax on income generated in the formal sector. The government adopts the tax level pre-
ferred by the majority. Unlike the economic models of the informal sector, the median voter
theorem allows us to treat the government as an actor in the political-economic system and
hence does not detach it from the electorate. Secondly, following the literature on models of
dual economies, we build in a second sector to the Meltzer and Richard set-up. We assume
that the workers are homogenous in the informal sector. There is a fixed amount of wage
such that an informal sector worker can only earn less than what the lowest productivity
worker in the informal sector earns post-tax.
When the distribution of workers is such that a majority is not skilled to earn enough
post-tax income in the formal sector, they may choose to work in the informal sector simply
because they would rather avoid being taxed. The fact that non-taxation is an indirect
form of subsidizing incomes so that the informal sector acts as an alternative mechanism
of redistribution is why the majority votes for a small portion of formal sector income,
especially when there are not enough formal sector workers to generate subsidy income for
the entire population. Since few workers operate in the formal sector, it is normal to find less
revenue generated to redistribute (compared to the developed countries). In other words, if
the informal sector is profitable enough, it creates work for the low-productivity individuals
(who would otherwise be non-workers at home). Creation of new jobs itself becomes a
subsidy for the poor. Hence, we conclude that the size of the informal sector and the level
of redistribution is the result of the joint eﬀects of distributional factors and how lucrative
the informal sector is. The important comparative static that emerges from our analysis is
that increasing the wages in the informal sector vis-a-vie the earnings in the formal sector
leads to a decrease in subsidies and an increase in the informal sector size, which supports
the intuition that non-taxation is an indirect form of subsidizing incomes and that informal
sector acts as an alternative way of redistribution.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we briefly discuss the
features of the informal sector. In the third section, we describe the theoretical model. In
section 4, we discuss the data, and in section 5, we present the results. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Urban Informal Sector
The informal sector has consistently been an important source of income for the poor,
especially in developing countries. Hence the size, cause and the consequences of it has been
attracting a great deal of attention over the past couple of decades, both by scholars and
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by policy-makers alike4. As the cities in many developing countries are rapidly growing in
size5, a large proportion of those working in these urban areas derive their income from the
informal sector. This is especially significant in Latin American countries where the cities
are booming due to lower death rates and higher life expectancy, but also as a result of
migration from the countryside6.
Firms that engage in urban informal economic activity can be described as very small-
scale units that are not registered in oﬃcial statistics. They consist largely of independent,
self-employed producers, which in most instances is a family network. Informal firms operate
with very little capital, or none at all since they rarely have any access to credit markets.
Furthermore, not having formal education or access to training institutions, the workers
utilize a low level of technology and skills, which makes them operate at a low level of
productivity and therefore earn very low (and irregular) incomes (Sethuraman, 1991). Entry
and exit are also easier than in the formal sector. Examples of informal activities may
include retail trade, transport, repair and maintenance, construction, personal and domestic
services, and manufacturing.
We exclude any criminal activity such as drug-traﬃcking in the definition of informal
work as we use in this paper. Unlike criminal sector, the production and output of the in-
formal sector is entirely legal, however the fact that the output does not appear in national
tax accounts makes it illegal. A distinction should also be made between undeclared pro-
duction by oﬃcially recorded firms (irregular sector) and illegal production of legal goods
by unoﬃcial firms (informal sector)7. The production in the irregular sector (such as tax-
evasion, social security fraud, avoidance of labor/safety regulations, etc.), is illegal although
the output is not. Although both irregular and informal economic activity are motivated
by a desire to avoid costs associated with regulation, these two activities have diﬀerent dy-
namics in the sense that, in the irregular sector, the same good is produced with the same
production capabilities of the formal sector but with a diﬀerent profit return. Therefore we
4See the special feature in the Economic Journal (1999), and Schneider and Enste (2000) for an extensive
literature review.
5To give some examples, according to the 1997 World Development Report issued by the World Bank,
the percentage of the population living in urban areas of Brazil is 78%, in Mexico, 75%, in Turkey, 70%,
and in Lebanon, 87%.
6For evidence on Latin America, see Loayza (1994), Portes and Schauﬄer (1993).On average, the informal
sector in Latin America accounted for about a quarter of urban jobs in 1990 varying from 20 to over 50
percent across diﬀerent Latin countries. During the same year in sub-Saharan Africa, the share of urban
labor force in the informal sector was estimated to be around 61 percent and it showed little variation across
countries. In Asia, the percentages typically hover around 40-60 percent, but there is a wide variation across
its countries [Sethuraman (1998), p.10].
7Here we adopt Thomas’ (1992) terminology.
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restrict ourselves to studying the informal sector only8.
Before we turn our attention to the formal model, a few comments are in order. We
should note that this model abstracts many important features of the informal sector. First
of all, we have assumed a fixed informal wage rate to keep the model simple. In fact, Thomas
quotes from the 1972 Kenya mission report to the International Labor Organization (ILO)
that the informal wage is determined endogenously in the market, although the work is still
labor-intensive and locally produced (p.53).
Although the informal sector pays less than the formal sector in most instances, there is a
wide diversity of earnings. As ILO’s Regional Employment Program, known by its Spanish
acronym PREALC, reports in the context of Latin America (Tokman, 1990, p.95), the
informal sector wages are still lower than the formal sector earnings. In this model, we take
the informal wage to be lower than the informal sector earnings which is in fact confirmed by
Mazumdar (1976), and is consistent with the empirical findings of Lemieux, Fortin, Frechette
(1994) that ”the labor earnings in the underground [informal] sector are concentrated among
[would-be] workers with low earnings in the regular sector (p.239, brackets our addition).
Secondly, many scholars have emphasized the costs of operating in either sector (Loayza,
1996; De Soto, 1989, Tokman, 1990). In the formal sector, the firms have to comply with
regulations such as labor safety, environmental protection, consumer protection and quality
control, as well as bureaucratic requirements such as registration procedures, and other
paper work. They also have to pay taxes. Whereas in the informal sector, there are costs to
getting caught since the informal firm is penalized if detected. Furthermore, the informal
sector cannot take advantage of government-provided goods such as the police and the
judicial system. The model as it is now does not reflect the costs associated with staying in
either sector.
Thirdly, not all types of informal work is labor-intensive. There is documentation in
certain contexts that there are micro-producers capable of producing with modern technol-
ogy and capital accumulation. However the existence of this type is exceptional in Latin
America [Portes and Schauﬄer, (1993)]. These points show that the informal sector is het-
erogenous and while we do think that they are very important in characterizing the informal
sector realistically, we also believe that the simple model we present here captures the main
intuition behind income redistribution when there is an informal sector present.
8There is a rather extentive research on irregular sector (sometimes referred to as the ’shadow’ or ’black’
or ’subterranean’ or ’underground’ economy), mostly in the context of developed countries [see e.g. Gaertner
and Alois (1985), Lemieux, Fortin, Frechette (1994)].
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3 The Model
3.1 Structure of the economy
Assume that the workers in the economy diﬀer in productivity, ε, which is assumed to be
distributed lognormally so that ε v LN(ε¯, σ2ε) with support (0,+∞) and the worker with
the median productivity, εm, is below the mean, ε¯. In the formal sector there is only one
firm which holds the entire amount of capital9. The earnings of formal sector workers are
subject to tax, whereas the earnings from the informal sector are not. In the formal sector,
the workers are price-takers. In the informal sector, the wage w¯ is fixed, assuming that
everybody who chooses to work here is equally productive in a simple task. Note that w¯ is
less than what the least productive worker in the formal sector can make.
The workers get utility from consumption c and leisure l, assuming that u(c, l) is strictly
concave in l, and that both consumption and leisure are normal goods. We specify the
utility function as a Cobb-Douglas function
u = (1− a) ln(c) + a ln(l) (1)
where 0 < a < 1.
Since an individual has the option of working in both (or in any) of the sectors, his
consumption is the total of after-tax wages in the formal sector, the informal market earn-
ings, and the subsidy he receives after the decision with regard to the tax level is made. He
maximizes his utility over the amount of work he supplies to either sector
maxu subject to c = (1− t)nfwfε+ niw¯ + s (2)
l = 1− nf − ni
l ≥ 0, nf ≥ 0, ni ≥ 0
where nf and ni are the ratio of hours of work in the formal and the informal sector
respectively to their total time, wf is the formal sector wage rate, w¯ is the fixed informal
sector wage, t is the tax rate, s is the lump-sum subsidy, and time endowment is normalized
to 1. Note that there are no entry costs to switching to the informal sector. There is no
9Or, there is a large number of homogenous firms.
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solution for which both nf and ni are positive because first order conditions hold individ-
ually but not simultaneously as a result of additively separable utility10. In other words,
a particular worker will not mix between the informal and formal sector. He is indiﬀerent
between working in the formal or the informal sector when his after-tax earnings in the
formal sector is equal to what he can make in the informal sector.
Looking for the optimal mix of nf and ni, satisfying the first order conditions give
w¯ = (1− t)wfε (3)
The optimal share of hours of formal work for an individual, given that his productivity
is above a certain threshold (otherwise he will choose not to work and receive subsidy), is
given by
nf∗ = (1− a)− as
(1− t)wfε (4)
And following from (4), the optimal share of the amount of informal sector work (given
that the equilibrium state of the world is the informal sector) is
ni∗ = (1− a)− as
w¯
(5)
Notice that the hours of work in the informal sector (and the earnings from that sector)
do not depend on the level of productivity11, precisely because we have assumed the same
level of productivity for all workers as soon as they enter this market. In other words, the
indirect utility an individual derives from the informal sector is greater than the indirect
utility of not working at all, when ni > 0.
Solving equation (4) for ε, we can now specify a critical level of productivity ε∗ for formal
sector
ε∗ =
w¯
(1− t)wf (6)
For individuals with productivity level above ε∗, after-tax earnings in the formal sector
are larger than the informal sector income, hence they devote all their work hours to the
formal sector.12
10See Appendix A
11Let nf in equation (4) go to zero to see that the optimal hours of work in the informal sector depends
only on s and on the exogeneous parameters of the model.
12If ε > ε∗, then nf∗ = 1− l∗ and ni = 0.If ε < ε∗, then nf∗ = 0 and ni = 1− l∗.
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There is also a critical productivity level below which the individual will choose not to
work at all and simply receive the government subsidy. Let the fractions of time allocated
to work (in both sectors) equal to zero in (4) to find
(1− a)(1− t)wfε = as
Solving for the cut-oﬀ level of productivity ε∗∗, we get the following for the informal
sector
ε∗∗ =
as
(1− a)(1− t)wf (7)
When ε∗∗ < ε∗ (i.e. there are no non-workers) , and following from (4) and (5), the
following inequality holds
(1− a)w¯ > as
This is not surprising because if the informal wage is appreciated more than the subsidy,
then the informal sector appears as a better alternative to non-work. Hence, when ε∗∗ < ε∗,
all individuals who choose not to work in the formal sector, will always work in the informal
sector.
These results imply that there are three possible states of the world. First of all, a formal
sector might coexist with an informal sector, in which case a worker always devotes all of
his work hours to one sector. In this equilibrium, there are no non-workers. This is the case
when ε∗ > ε∗∗. However, if ε∗∗ > ε∗, then the informal sector vanishes. This is the second
possible state of the world: when people either work in the formal sector or stay home to
receive a subsidy income. And finally, there might be a world where everybody chooses to be
employed in the formal sector (i.e. ε∗ = 0, ε∗∗ = 0). It is not possible to have a state where
ε∗ = 1 because of the assumption that ”w¯ is less than what the least productive worker
in the formal sector can make”. In other words, even if the the distribution is such that
almost everybody is an unskilled worker, there is at least somebody who would be better
oﬀ working in the formal sector.13.
We now need to know the formal sector wage rate, wf . The firm sets wf equal to
the marginal product of the eﬀective labor force L. For simplicity, we assume that the
production function is a simple linear function of the form
13An equilibrium, where everybody would prefer not to work, is not sustainable because there will be no
income generated.
9
Y = G(K)L
where G is an exogenous function of capital K. Therefore, the wage rate in the formal
sector is
wf =
∂Y
∂L
= G(K) (8)
Plugging the expression for wf into (8), (9) and (6) respectively gives
ε∗ =
w¯
(1− t)G(K) (9)
ε∗∗ =
as
(1− a)(1− t)G(K) (10)
nf∗ = (1− a)− as
(1− t)G(K)ε for ε > ε
∗ (11)
3.2 Competitive and Political Economic Equilibrium
In this paper, we discuss two types of equilibria, namely the competitive equilibrium with
exogenous taxes and political economic equilibrium with endogenous taxes. Under competi-
tive equilibrium the model produces results similar to those found in the previous literature
on informal sector. These are summarized in the following proposition.
Proposition 1. An increase in the tax rate shrinks the formal sector size and increases
unemployment.
Proof: See Appendix B.
This is not surprising since more workers will find it better to work in the informal sector
and more than make up for the loss in income by not paying taxes. An increase in taxes
will have two opposite eﬀects on employment. Firstly, it will increase the threshold, ε∗∗, for
participation in the labor force as shown in equation 10. Second, by inducing entry to the
informal sector from the formal sector, it causes a decrease in subsidies which in turn lowers
the threshold for employment. The first eﬀect dominates the second for all choices of tax
rates.
To discuss the political economic equilibrium we refer to the median voter theorem. As
Roberts (1977) proves and as Meltzer and Richards (1981) apply in their paper, the voter
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with the median income is decisive in the choice of the tax level if the post-tax income
of the individuals, y, is monotonically ordered by their productivity for all s and t, given
that the voting is over only one of those policies. And if the ordering of individual incomes
is independent of the choice of s and t, then the individual choice of tax rate is inversely
ordered by income.
To formally prove this point within the context of this paper consider the balanced
budget requirement for the government :
s = ty¯ (12)
where y¯ is the total income generated in the formal sector. Under any tax schedule, the
richer will still be relatively richer than a poorer individual after redistribution (although
relatively less richer), assuming that the voting space is unidimensional, i.e. the individuals
do not solve the problem of taxation and redistribution independently of each other. This
is enough to establish that the choice of the tax rate is ordered by productivity, for all s
and t. Using (8) and (11), the income of a formal sector worker is
y = nfwfε = ε(1− a)G(K)− as
(1− t) (13)
∂y
∂ε
= (1− a)G(K) > 0, ∀(s, t) (14)
Equation (13) shows that individuals can be ordered monotonically along the productiv-
ity dimension and this ordering still holds true regardless of the tax policy to be chosen. Also
remember that the informal sector wage is at the lower end of the earnings spectrum so that
it does not violate monotonicity. From (14), the income of an individual is inversely corre-
lated with his preferred tax rate, but positively correlated with his productivity. Therefore,
a high-productivity worker will prefer a low tax rate. The worker with the median produc-
tivity will decide on the policy. Finally, we show that the subsidies are uniquely determined
by the choice of tax rates.
Proposition 2. There is a unique level of subsidy, s, that is determined by y¯ for each t,
Proof: See Appendix B.
We have assumed a continuous distribution of productivity among workers, where ε v
LN [0,+∞] and the worker with median productivity, εm is below the worker with mean
productivity, ε¯. Since the preference of the median voter prevails, we are interested in
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the worker with the median productivity. His choice of t, hence s, determines the size
of redistribution, provided that ε∗ < εm < ε¯. However, each particular position of the
median voter below the mean will produce diﬀerent equilibrium levels of redistribution.
The relationship between εm and t∗ is depicted in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 About Here
The intuition behind the picture is as follows. We know that the worker at ε¯ does not
gain from redistribution so the preferred rate of tax of a decisive voter at this point is t = 0.
A median worker who is not in the formal sector (regardless of whether the informal sector
exists or not), will have the highest tax rate that he can choose, tmax. All he cares about is
to maximize the subsidy he receives (since the informal sector earnings is independent of the
threshold). But the equilibrium tax rate has to be less than 1 because he will be concerned
about the eﬀects of disincentives to work on the formal sector workers. Between tmax and
t = 0, we expect to find a monotonically decreasing slope because the median voter is in the
formal sector and is subject to both distortionary and wealth eﬀects as we have discussed
at the beginning of this paper14.
To formally prove this intuition behind the graph, we have to consider the individual
problem of the median voter in each sector. If the equilibrium state of the world is such
that the informal sector exists, then tmax = ti∗, the preferred tax rate of a median voter who
works in the informal sector. Since the productivity of anyone who works in the informal
sector is the same by assumption, anybody below ε∗ including the median voter have the
same preferences. The utility function for those working in the informal sector is
ui = (1− a) ln
¡
niw¯ + s
¢
+ a ln
¡
1− ni
¢
Their preferred level of tax is derived by solving (15) for ti∗ after substituting (5) and
(12),
d
dt
∙
(1− a) ln ((1− a) (w¯ + ty¯)) + a ln
µ
a+
aty¯
w¯
¶¸
= 0 (15)
If ε∗∗ is binding, i.e. there is no informal sector, then those individuals with productivity
below this cut-oﬀ point are non-workers with the following utility function
un = (1− a) ln s
14The intuition we provide might explain a decreasing but not necessarily a monotonic line. Secondly,
the line need not be linear as seen in the diagram.
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where the superscript n denotes ’non-work’. Their (and a non-worker median voter’s)
preferred level of tax, tmax = tn∗ is determined by solving (16)
d
dt
[(1− a) ln (ty¯)] = 0 (16)
A median voter with productivity above ε∗ is a worker in the formal sector and will have
a preferred rate of tax that decreases with ε 15 as indicated by the sloped line in Figure 2.
The utility of the median voter in the formal sector is
uf = (1− a) ln
¡
(1− t)nfwfεm + s
¢
+ a ln
¡
1− nf
¢
(17)
Substituting (8) and (11) into (17)
uf = (1− a) ln ((1− t)εm(1− a)G(K)− as+ s) + a ln
µ
a+
as
(1− t)G(K)εm
¶
The median voter chooses a tax rate that balances the government budget and maximizes
his own utility subject to his own budget constraints, and solves the following
d
dt
∙
(1− a) ln (ym + (1− a)ty¯) + a ln
µ
a+
aty¯
ym
¶¸
= 0 (18)
where the income of the median voter ym is a function of his own preferred tax rate.
Note that y¯, which enters into the optimization problems of all types of decisive voters
[equations (15), (16) and (18)] is again a function of their own preferred tax rate16. Hence it
is not possible to characterize the equilibrium rates of tax in functional form and compare
which equilibrium is higher. However we can represent each individual problem in terms of
equilibrium deadweight losses created by each equilibrium level of tax. These deadweight
losses allows us to compare equilibrium tax rates among diﬀerent skill distributions (hence
the amount of redistribution), if not the equilibrium size of the informal sector.
Proposition 3. The tax rate for the non-worker is fixed , the tax rate chosen by the
informal worker is decreasing by the leisure parameter, and it is increasing by the informal
wage. The tax rate for the formal worker is always decreasing by the median voter’s income.
Proof :
15Note that ∂y∂t < 0 from (15)
16See equation (18) and note that the lower limit of the integral is determined by the critical threshold
level which itself is a function of t.
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The solution to equation (16) yields the following deadweight loss
t
y¯
dy¯
dt
= μn = −1 (19)
Equation (15) gives
t
y¯
dy¯
dt
= μi = −1 + a(1− w¯) (20)
and (18) gives
t
y¯
dy¯
dt
= μf = −1 + y
m
y¯
(21)
where μ indicates the deadweight losses incurred by the equilibrium level of tax in each
case.17
Proposition 4 Suppose the informal sector exists (so that non-work is no longer prof-
itable) with 0 < ym < y¯ and 0 ≤ w¯ ≤ 1, then ti∗ > tf∗ if a < ymy¯ < 1. If 0 <
ym
y¯ < a, i.e.
the skill distribution is skewed enough, the median voter does not necessarily prefer a higher
tax rate. If 1 < w¯ then ti∗ > tf∗ regardless of the distributional features.
Proof: See Appendix B.
Overall, the above proposition implies that the choice of tax rate is an inverse u-shaped
function of the informal wage given the distribution is skewed enough. As informal wage
increases, the positive income eﬀect of switching to informal sector initially dominates the
incentives from choosing lower tax rates. A further increase in the informal wage, however
, implies less inequality and a faster increase in the informal sector size which decreases
subsidies substantially. In this case, a median voter in the informal sector prefers a lower
tax rate to keep informal sector from growing and subsidies from falling.
In the next section we rely on numerical techniques to find the political economic equi-
librium of the model and to analyze the eﬀects of policy changes on the choice of the tax
rate, the informal sector size as well as the welfare.18
17Note that if there is no informal sector, a non-worker median voter sets a higher tax rate than if he
were in the formal sector, i.e. tf∗ < tn∗. This follows directly from (19) and (21) since 0 < y
m
y¯ < 1. This
case holds true only if the informal sector wage rate w¯ is not high enough to eliminate the non-work sector
(to be precise, ”the ratio of G(K)/w¯ is not low enough”). It does not make sense to compare the decision
of the non-working median voter with the decision of the median voter in the informal sector [i.e. equations
(19) and (20)] because these two situations cannot exist simultaneously.
18For the analytical exercise in endogenizing tax rates see Appendix B.
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4 The Data
To characterize the heterogeneity of the agents in the model, we used hourly wage distri-
butions for USA for the year 1990 and Mexico for 199219. Although the base years are
diﬀerent, we assume that the changes in the skills of the Mexican worker between 1990 and
1992 are not significant to alter the results. The USA hourly wage distribution is taken from
Imrohoroglu, Merlo and Rupert (2000), who use data from the March Current Population
Survey of the Bureau of the Census for the survey year 1991 to examine the relationship
between crime and redistribution20. Of this data, women, those who are reported as retired,
working in the military, in school, disabled, and 65 years of age or older are eliminated. The
restricted sample size contains 30,472 cases. Since the data does not account for the earning
capabilities of the oﬃcially unemployed, the authors use a standard Heckman two-step pro-
cedure to obtain unbiased structural parameters of the model. The mean and the standard
deviation of the corrected sample are 2.28 and 0.69, respectively, which imply an average
hourly wage of $12.40 with a standard deviation of $9.70.
The Mexican monthly wage distribution is from the National Statistical Institute of
Mexico. The data covers 8756 cases, both men and women who work in various industrial
and service sectors and is not corrected for sample selection. Although the qualitative results
remain unaﬀected for the purposes of this paper, we discuss the eﬀects of sample selection
problem in the next section. The biased mean and the standard deviation are 6.79 and 1.38
respectively, which correspond to and average monthly wage of $888.91 with a standard
deviation of $665.31.
Regarding the ’share of leisure’ parameter a, we chose 0.64 for USA which is consistent
with many calibration studies [see e.g. Kydland and Prescott (1982)] and the empirical
literature on time use [see, e.g. Juster and Staﬀord (1991)]. For Mexico, we used 0.46,
which is the value for the developing countries as reported by the World Bank. These
figures imply that in the US, a worker spends about one third of his discretionary time
working, whereas for a Mexican worker this ratio is about one half.
5 Results
In this section we discuss the findings of the simulation. We start by examining the political-
economic equilibria generated by the median voter. We further check for comparative statics
19These particular years are chosen out of convinience and avaliability.
20The data refer to the calender year proceding the March survey.
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with respect to the given variable in the model, namely the informal sector wage, and also
consider the eﬀects of a flawed democratic system. Finally we examine the sensitivity of our
results to the choice parameter a.
To provide terms of comparison for the numbers generated, here is a brief summary of
the statistics of the US and Mexican economies. In 1990, the GNP per capita in USA was
$22,276, and social welfare expenditures net of expenditures on education and transfers to
the elderly were 7.8 percent of GNP21. In 1992, the GNP per capita in Mexico was $2,49022,
and the same type of welfare expenditures were virtually non-existent 23. The reported sizes
of the informal sector vary depending on the method used24. Unfortunately, sources do not
systematically compare diﬀerent methods for all countries, let alone present information
for any year. Schneider and Enste(2000) report the size of the informal sector in USA in
1995 to be 9.5 percent of GDP25. According to PREALC, the 1989 estimate of the urban
informal employment as percent of the urban economically active population in Mexico
was 34.826. However, the PREALC figures are criticized heavily by Portes and Schauﬄer
for underestimating the actual magnitude of those engaged in informal economic activities
because it focuses only on self-employed workers excluding professionals, unremunerated
family workers, domestic servants, and rural workers. The authors argue that economically
active urban population not covered by social security is a better proxy, which yields a 46.8
percent.
5.1 Political-Economic Equilibria
In this subsection, we describe the equilibrium determined by the median voter in the
economies characterized by the parameters described as above, given that the informal
sector pays 0.2 times an average formal job. For both USA and Mexico, this ratio is enough
for the informal sector to dominate the option of ’non-work’, and induce all those who
would stay home and simply receive the subsidy to go out and seek informal work. In a
developed country the decisive worker is most likely a formal worker as there are relatively
more skilled people. The median voter in USA prefers a tax rate of 28 percent and the
size of the informal sector is 6.5 percent, while the income of an average worker is $20,960.
Whereas in a developing country, the decisive voter is more likely to be a poor worker since
21U.S. Department of Commerce (1995).
22World Bank (1992).
23IMF (1992).
24For the survey method, calculations also depend on the definition of what constitutes informal work
25As percentage of GNP and calculations based on currency demand approach.
26Portes and Schauﬄer (1993), p.42.
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the wage (productivity) distribution is strongly right skewed. Given the skill distribution
in Mexico, the equilibrium tax is 72 percent which is the maximum rate that an informal
worker would choose. Therefore, given the same estimate of relative profitability of informal
work compared to what the average formal job would pay, the equilibrium is a high taxes
with a large informal sector of 66 percent. The total income of the average worker is $9,571.
The results for the US economy are fairly close to the real figures as we described at the
beginning of this section, with the exception of level of subsidies but the figures for Mexico
are highly optimistic. Selection problem should be partly responsible for such high figures
but should not be enough to bring the tax level down to the reported levels. Assuming there
are more unskilled workers in Mexico, we expect the truncation to be stronger than the US
sample. Once corrected, we would expect the threshold to decrease more than the decrease
in the position of the median voter, who now becomes a worker in the formal sector. This
would have to eﬀect of reducing both taxes and the size of the informal sector to lower
levels. However, the illustration is still very useful so far to draw an important conclusion:
Depending on the properties of the wage distribution, an economy that has an even more
generous a welfare system than another may also produce a considerably bigger informal
sector. We are not aware of any work in the informal sector literature that address the issue
of distributional factors on either the size of the informal sector or the level of transfers.
However, our observation is consistent with the findings in the economic growth literature
that ”there will be a strong demand for redistribution in societies where a large section of
the population does not have access to productive resources of the economy” [Alesina and
Rodrik, 1994, p.484; also see Benabou (1996)].
5.2 Comparative Statics
Equation (9) indicates that the size of the informal sector varies with the ratio of the informal
sector wage to the formal sector wage rate. In other words, it is not the absolute but the
relative informal wage that draws or drives away workers. We normalize the amount of
capital (i.e. the wage rate in the formal economy since G(K) = wf) to 1 in both countries,
which allows us to test for the impact of the level of economic development or an exogenous
change in the profitability of the informal sector at the same time simply by varying w¯.
Obviously, USA and Mexico do not have the same amount of physical capital. However,
since the size of the informal sector and redistribution are determined by relative wages,
the level of development defined by the wealth of capital in the economy does not aﬀect the
level of redistribution as long as the relative lucrativeness of the informal sector remains the
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same across countries. What is really aﬀected by the exact value of G(K) is the amount
of income generated in the formal sector which is a part of the total income. This is also
the reason why the total income of the Mexican economy generated by the model turns
out to be unrealistically high ($11, 396). A small w¯ can be possible either because there is
now more physical capital in the economy (higher economic development), or because the
informal sector is evolving to pay oﬀ more.
Holding other parameters constant, we find that an increase in w¯ causes the equilibrium
level subsidies to rise slightly initially, but then drop consistently, while there is an increase
in the size of the informal sector. The initial rise is due to the fact that since some workers
switch to the informal sector now that it pays more, the median voter tries to compensate for
the loss in income (hence in the subsidy he receives) by increasing the tax rate. However, as
w¯ increases and as even more people switch to the informal sector, the distortionary eﬀects
of taxation has more importance. When the formal sector shrinks, the median voter receives
less subsidies. Therefore, he compensates for the loss in his total income by lowering taxes
on his income. His decision is to maximize his total income while at the same time he has
to make a trade oﬀ between the two diﬀerent sources of income. Table 1. below shows the
generated figures for the US and Mexican economy. The first column shows how much the
informal sector pays as a ratio of average formal sector wage. The first and and second
columns are the size of redistribution for USA and Mexico respectively, whereas the third
and fourth columns are the sizes of the informal sectors. Note that when w¯ = 0.1, the
equilibrium state of nature for both countries is a formal sector without the informal sector,
which is not profitable enough to appear as a source of income.
Lower subsidies and a bigger informal sector supports the idea that informal work is a
substitute for redistribution. The same qualitative results hold true for Mexico without the
initial rise because the median voter is now an informal sector worker. His concern is only
to maximize subsidies without attracting too many workers into the informal sector and
over-reducing the formal sector earnings (which will be taxed to provide that subsidy).
Table 1 About Here
Although the above experiment explains why we might observe low redistribution with
high informal sectors, the figures for the Mexican welfare system still turn out to be unrealis-
tically generous. In order to produce the quantitative diﬀerences between Mexico and USA,
we have to move away from the democratic set-up. In other words, it is not realistic to ex-
pect labor laws to be suﬃcient, or to expect labor unions to operate without suppression to
the extent that it would be in the USA. By letting the preferences of the richer (as opposed
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to the majority) prevail, the equilibrium is a lower redistribution with smaller non-formal
sector. The interesting result is, after a certain level of bias in favor of the richer, the system
can produce huge tax cuts with just a slight increase in authoritarianism. For example a 1
percent increase in the position of the decisive voter from the 74the percentile to 75th de-
creases taxes from 20% to 5%, keeping the same informal/formal wage rate. Large tax cuts
imply large subsidy cuts but may not mean a sharp decrease in informal activity. Assuming
that the government is responsive to the interests of a formal worker in the 74th percentile
as a benchmark, the equilibrium size of the informal sector is 37%, the average income is
$13,939. Now, if the decisive voter is in the 75th percentile, then the drop in the taxes (and
subsidies) increases the profitability of the formal sector and attracts more workers into that
sector, shrinking the informal economy by 5%. The fact that the formal sector is larger in
this case compared to ’democratic Mexico’ is due to lower taxes, which makes this sector
more appealing for at least some more people. Table 2 gives the comparative statics results
where the first row is the position of the median voter along the income percentile scale.
Table 2 About Here
If the distribution of incomes is skewed enough (to the right), high redistribution with
large informal sector will still be an appealing alternative when we allow the decisive voter
to be richer, as seen in the first three columns. However, after a certain percentage, the
amount of rich people in the economy decline so radically that the cuts in taxes are equally
large. Since there is no change in the profitability in the informal sector to compensate
for the loss in redistribution, we do not observe an increase in its size. When coupled
with a suitable wage distribution, the type of political regime acts to reduce the size of
welfare transfers much faster than the equivalent reduction in the informal sector. Hence, a
political system that is hostile to the poor can work to impede the positive eﬀects of economic
growth. This is apparent in Loayza’s (1994) observation that ’informal employment declines
in importance as the general level of development rises’ However, it remains large even in
high-income developing countries, in which it employs 31% of the labor force” (p.2). Table
3. summarizes the findings across USA and two diﬀerent political regimes in Mexico, while
keeping the parameters of the distribution and choice variables constant as indicated in
section 4. The first row refers to the level of redistribution (taxes), the second is the size of
the informal sector, and the thirds row is the total income in the economy.
Table 3 About Here
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Therefore, in reality we might observe high informal sectors with high redistribution and
also the same with low redistribution in developing countries depending on how democratic
the regime is. However, the overall welfare (measured by the average income in the society) is
higher than it would have been under total democracy simply because the high-productivity
is not heavily taxed, and these workers pull up the average.
5.3 Sensitivity Analysis
The leisure parameter, a, in the utility function is inversely correlated with subsidies but
positively correlated with the size of the non-formal sector while the equilibrium remains
robust. In other words, when people do not value consumption as much, they also do not
care about subsidies or wages as much either. They are also more likely to work less hours in
the formal sector, or not work at all, which points to a decline in total income of the median-
productivity worker. As we have indicated before, a worker in the developing country is
likely to spend about half of his time oﬀ work, whereas in a developed country, a worker
spares about two thirds of his time for leisure activities. Table 4 shows a change in a for
the US economy. Same qualitative results hold true for Mexico.
Table 4 About Here
6 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we have constructed a general equilibrium model to analyze incentives for
workers to engage in informal economic activity and determine the level of redistribution
in a political-economic equilibrium, while treating the distribution of productivity and the
informal sector wage as exogenous. We then simulated the model since it was not possible to
obtain a close-form solution. The purpose of the simulation is not to reproduce the statistical
figures for the US and Mexican economies, but to illustrate the nature of the relationship
between redistribution and informal sector while accounting for the coexistence of varying
levels of informal sectors and welfare systems. The model is simple and excludes issues such
as costs to regulation and punishment, competitive informal sector wages, capital formation
in the formal sector, and the rural informal sector. Despite these simplifications however,
the political aspect of the model, which has been entirely ignored in the literature, brings
in an important dynamic to the analysis .
We have shown that the informal sector operates in a way to reduce the burden of
redistribution by creating work for poor, low productivity people who otherwise would be
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solely dependent on government subsidy. In fact, the demand for redistribution declines as
the profitability in the informal sector rises. However, the informal sector earnings is not
enough to explain some of the observations in the world. A distortion in the democratic
rule in favor of the rich also reduces transfers while the size of the informal sector may
remain at high levels. Despite a greater demand for redistribution in societies where the
majority has few resources (skills), we found that political systems which work in favor of a
rich minority will produce little redistribution. If this is a developing country where there
are a lot of poor, uneducated workers, a more lucrative formal sector may not be taken
advantage of by the majority unless the skill distribution is improved. This certainly calls
for pro-poor measures such as free training and education programs should be oﬀered to
those who cannot aﬀord it. In most instances, it is also possible to gain skills on the job,
and then move to a better-paid job in the informal sector using similar skills (Sethuraman,
1998).
This model can also account for how much of the informal sector is ”voluntary” in
a particular economy. Involuntary informal employment can arise if some of the workers
who has incentive to chose the formal sector cannot find employment in that sector, and
consequently shift to alternative work. The policy prescription here is to promote the
establishment of more jobs in the formal sector, which is the view that PREALC upholds
for Latin America. However, determination of the magnitude of ”voluntary” employment
necessarily depends on the use of available statistics, which as we mentioned before is beset
with many diﬃculties. Diﬀerent estimation methods make the interpretation of economic
models rather diﬃcult and can lead to contradictory policies.
7 Appendix
Appendix A. Regression Analysis .
We use Penn World Table 6.2 for GDP data, IMF Government Finance Statistics Year-
book 2001 and 2003 for social security and welfare spending, and Schneider (2002) for data
on informal sector size. We exclude the formerly communist countries from the sample set.
We regress social welfare expenditures per capita on the informal sector size as a percentage
of GDP using GDP per capita as the control variable. The coeﬃcient of the informal sector
size is -0.025 with a t-statistic of -2.60.
Appendix B. Proof of Propositions in the Text.
Proof of Proposition 1.
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Assuming that t is exogenous, it is easy to see from (9) that an increase in taxes will
correspond to an increase in ε∗. In other words, the formal sector shrinks.
To see how ε∗∗, and therefore unemployment, is aﬀected by an exogenous change in t,
reconsider the formula for the leisure threshold assuming G(K) = 1.
ε∗∗ =
aty¯
(1− a)(1− t)
A change in the tax rates at the top and bottom of the ratio will have the same aﬀect on
ε∗∗. However, we need to know how y changes to reach a conclusion. Expand and re-group
the expression for average income in (17) to get
y¯ =
(1− a)
R∞
w¯
1−t
εf (ε) dε
1 + at
1−t
¡
1− F
¡
w¯
1−t
¢¢
where 1− F
¡
w¯
1−t
¢
is the cumulative distribution of ε from w¯
1−t to ∞. So far, we cannot
tell how y¯ behaves as t changes. An increase in t decreases the numerator but may increase
or decrease the denominator. So, plug this back into the expression for ε∗∗ and multiply top
and bottom by (1− t) to get
ε∗∗ =
at
R∞
w¯
1−t
εf (ε) dε
(1− t) + at
¡
1− F
¡
w¯
1−t
¢¢
It is obvious that as lim
t→0
ε∗∗ = 0
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t→1
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where f
¡
w¯
1−t
¢
is the lognormal distribution of ε at w¯
1−t . Since taking the first derivative
does not give a solution, we consider the second derivative. Plugging in the expression for
the lognormal distribution gives
lim
t→1
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µ
1√
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Taking the second derivative of the above expression results in
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lim
t→1
ε∗∗ =
−e
−1/2((ln( w¯1−t)−μ)/σ)
2
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i
−
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2
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0
To see the eﬀect of increasing taxes on ε∗∗ we rely on numerical methods because lim
t→0
ε∗∗ = 0
0
and applying the L’Hospital Rule successively does not simplify the problem. Using
US parameters the above function produces the following graph. Note that the below result
is robust to changes in the distributional parameters and the leisure parameter, a.
Figure A1 About Here
Proof of Proposition 2:
Consider the average income which depends on the formal wage rate and the eﬀective
labor force L,
y¯ =
Y
N
= wfL
where Y is the total income and N is the number of workers, which is normalized to 1.
Hence y¯ = Y . Substitute (10) to get
y¯ =
Y
N
= G(K)L
The eﬀective labor force is
L =
Z ∞
ε∗
nf(ε)εf(ε)dε
The expression for average income becomes,
y¯ = G(K)
Z ∞
ε∗
nf(ε)εf(ε)dε
Now substitute (11) to get
y¯ = G(K)
Z ∞
ε∗
∙
(1− a)− as
(1− t)G(K)ε
¸
εf(ε)dε
Plug (17) back into the balanced budget equation in (14)
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s = G(K)t
Z ∞
ε∗
∙
(1− a)− as
(1− t)G(K)ε
¸
εf(ε)dε
The proposition is true if there exists a fixed point to the above equation. Holding t
fixed, the right-hand side (RHS) is declining in s, and the left-hand side (LHS) is increasing
in s. When s = 0, LHS < RHS, and RHS goes to negative infinity while LHS > 0 as s
goes to infinity. Therefore, there is a unique s as a function of t. Note that changing the
tax rate aﬀects LHS ambiguously. Also note that the LHS and RHS are not necessarily
linear functions of s.
Proof of Proposition 4:
(I) If the median voter is in the formal sector, and 0 < ym < y¯, then conditions regarding
w¯ have to be checked.
(i) If 0 ≤ w¯ ≤ 1,
ym
y¯
? ≶? a (1− w¯) (22)
To check the boundaries, let w = 1 (i.e. when μi = −1 + 1 = 0). The right-hand side of
(26) becomes zero and we can conclude
ym
y¯
> 0 =⇒ t∗i = 0 < tf∗
Then let w = 0. The inequality in (20) is
ym
y¯
? ≶? a
So obviously the right-hand side of (20)) varies along [0, a]. We already know that ymy¯
∈ (0, 1) and a ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, we can state two more conditions
(*) if a < ymy¯ < 1, then μ
i > μf =⇒ ti∗ > tf∗
(**) if ymy¯ < a < 1, then we cannot immediately conclude anything because it
all depends on where the exogenous variable w¯ is between (0, a).
Note that a is the weight parameter on leisure in the utility function of the worker. So
whether the formal sector tax rate is higher than informal rate relates to (or is aﬀected by)
how much he likes leisure and the relative standing of his earned income with respect to the
average income in the formal sector.
The analysis will be concluded if it can be shown that (**) cannot be the case. In
particular, we need to check for the ambiguous inequality below
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y¯
ym
=
G(K)
R∞
ε∗
h
(1− a)− aty¯
(1−t)G(K)ε
i
εf(ε)dε
εm (1− a)G(K)− aty¯
(1−t)
≷ a
which after simplification becomes,
G(K) (1− a)
∙Z ∞
ε∗
εf(ε)dε− aεm
¸
≷ aty¯
(1− t)
∙Z ∞
ε∗
f(ε)dε− a
¸
However it is not possible to conclude which side of the inequality is bigger since en-
dogenously determined variables aﬀect the outcome.
(ii) If w¯ > 1, ti∗ > tf∗. See [(II)-a)] below. However, when w¯ is suﬃciently high, the
median worker will switch to the informal sector.
(II) If w¯ becomes high enough so that the median voter decides to work in the informal
sector, then we observe equation (24) being solved.
a) When w¯ > 1, regardless of what the y
m
y¯ ratio is, the deadweight loss incurred by
the informal sector decisive voter is higher than the loss were this voter in the formal sector.
Specifically, from (24)
w¯ > 1→ μi < −1
Since −1 < μf < 0 always hold, tax incurred by the informal median worker causes a
higher deadweight loss, hence ti∗ > tf∗. This clearly refers to the flat line in Figure 1.
b) When 0 ≤ w¯ ≤ 1, see the inconclusive condition [(I)-(i)] above. Note that the
worker will not stay in the informal sector if w¯ is low enough.
Appendix C. Endogenizing the Choice of Tax Rates.
Given the balanced budget condition s = t
_
y and ni∗ = (1−a)− asw¯ ,the individual chooses
t to maximize
ui = (1− a) ln ((1− a) (w¯ + ty¯)) + a ln
µ
a+
aty¯
w¯
¶
subject to
y¯ =
(1− a)G(K)
R∞
w¯
1−t
εf (ε) dε
1 + at
1−t
¡
1− F
¡
w¯
1−t
¢¢
where F
¡
w¯
1−t
¢
is the cumulative lognormal distribution of productivity evaluated at w¯
1−t .
and f (ε) = 1√
2πσ(ε)
e−1/2((ln(ε)−μ)/σ)
2
.Assuming w¯ + ty¯ 6= 0, taking the derivative of ui with
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respect to t leads to the following first order condition:
y¯ + t
dy¯
dt
= 0
which has to be solved for t.
Let dy¯dt =
1
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Using Leibniz rule yields:
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                        Table 1. Coefficient of the  Informal Sector Size1
Dependent Variable : Social Security and Welfare Spending as a Percentage of GDP
                    Model2 Pooled OLS Fixed Effects Random Effects
1 -0.23(3.62) -0.12(1.88) -0.52(3.79)
2 -0.33(4.35) -0.34(2.65) -0.92(5.44)
3 -0.21(1.98) -0.22(3.42) -0.12(3.10)
1 t-statistics in parenthesis
2 Model 1: Informal Sector Size
Model 2: Informal Sector Size, Tax Revenues/GDP
Model 2: Informal Sector Size, Tax Revenues/GDP, Gini Coefficient
Table 2. Effects of Change in the Informal Sector Wage on Taxes: Simulation Results.
                       Tax Rates                  Critical Productivity                 Income
USA Mexico USA Mexico USA Mexico 
Informal Sector Wage: w
0.1 0.27 0.73 0.02 0.63 $21,204 $8959
0.2 0.28* 0.72* 0.06* 0.66* $20,960* $9,571*
0.3 0.26 0.71 0.16 0.81 $21,333 $10,340
0.4 0.21 0.68 0.26 0.85 $21,642 $10,629
0.5 0.21 0.65 0.64 0.87 $23,045 $10,863
Table 3. Effect of the Change in the Identity of the Decisive Voter in Mexico 
Identity of the Median Voter : ε m 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
Equilibrium Tax Rate : t 0.72 0.72 0.66 0.64 0.43 0.05
Critical productivity : ε ? 0.66 0.66 0.61 0.60 0.47 0.32
                                      Table 4. Political-Economic Equilibria.
Democratic USA        Democratic Mexico                             Undemocratic Mexico
Equilibrium Tax Rate : t 0.28 0.72 0.05
Critical productivity : ε ? 0.065 0.66 0.32
Per Capita Income $20,960 $9571 $15059
Table 5. Effect of Change of the Leisure Paremeter (USA)
Leisure Parameter: a 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.8
Equilibrium Tax Rate : t 0.31 0.3 0.28 0.27 0.26 0.25
Critical productivity : ε ? 0.073 0.07 0.065 0.062 0.06 0.05
mε***,εε
{ }**max , ni ttt ∈
t
−ε
Figure 1. Identity of the Median Voter
not necessarily linear
